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Abstract (Document Summary) 
 
 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union has long been an issue of great debate. Some 
have questioned the EU’s willingness to welcome such a large, poor, and culturally 
distant country as a member; others have wondered whether Turkey can transform itself 
enough to meet the EU’s demands. Yet much of this talk has overlooked the Turkish 
army, even though it is a key player in the process thanks to its critical role in founding 
modern Turkey, its continued popularity within Turkish society, and its uniquely 
powerful voice in politics. None of the reforms the EU still requires of the Turkish 
government can be achieved without the military’s backing. Recent changes have already 
dramatically curbed the power of the Turkish military in several of its traditional areas of 
influence and reduced its long-standing authority in some civilian institutions. Not all of 
these adjustments have been greeted with open arms, but the Turkish General Staff (TGS) 
has largely complied with the EU’s demands even though doing so has forced it to let go 
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WILL COOPERATION LAST? 
 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union has long been an issue of great debate. Some 
have questioned the EU’s willingness to welcome such a large, poor, and culturally 
distant country as a member; others have wondered whether Turkey can transform itself 
enough to meet the EU’s demands. Yet much of this talk has overlooked the Turkish 
army, even though it is a key player in the process thanks to its critical role in founding 
modern Turkey, its continued popularity within Turkish society, and its uniquely 
powerful voice in politics. None of the reforms the EU still requires of the Turkish 
government can be achieved without the military’s backing. 
 
Recent changes have already dramatically curbed the power of the Turkish military in 
several of its traditional areas of influence and reduced its long-standing authority in 
some civilian institutions. Not all of these adjustments have been greeted with open arms, 
but the Turkish General Staff (TGS) has largely complied with the EU’s demands even 
though doing so has forced it to let go of power it had felt necessary to build up and 
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carefully guard for decades. The explanation for this sacrifice is twofold. Turkey’s 
generals have adapted because they see EU membership as the final stage of a 
modernization process they have supported for nearly a century. They also believe that 
the process leading to EU membership is the best means to confront key domestic 
challenges with which they have long struggled, such as Islamism and Kurdish 
separatism. So far, the deal has been worth their while. But with the EU’s decision in 
October to begin membership negotiations with Ankara, the need for reform, especially 
regarding the military’s policies on Kurdish secessionism and the status of Cyprus, will 
only intensify. And it remains to be seen how much further the Turkish military 
leadership will be willing to retreat. 
 
 
A MILITARY LIKE NO OTHER 
 
The Turkish armed forces have an unusual relationship with both the country’s civilian 
leadership and Turkish society. Despite its record of tampering with civilian politics and 
ousting democratically elected governments, the military remains extremely popular. A 
poll published in the daily newspaper Hrriyet last September found that the military was 
Turkey’s most trusted institution. The relationship between the Turkish military and 
Turkey’s civilian authorities may be an “exception to the ‘standardized’ civil-military 
relationship,” Chief of the General Staff of the Army Hilmi zkk said in a speech in 
August, but every country has “different needs, conditions, values, histories, societal 
concerns, and dynamics.” 
 
This popularity is largely a result of Turkey’s modern history. As the Ottoman Empire 
was collapsing after World War I and the ruling aristocracy was dithering in the face of 
invading foreign powers, the armed forces, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later 
known as Atatürk), struggled side by side with the people of Anatolia to protect the 
homeland. “While saving the very country, these soldiers also destroyed the political 
structure that had been based on the sultanate and caliphate,” zkk said last August. “They 
built up a new, modern system based on societal power. This change was as important for 
Turkey as was the Renaissance for those in the West, and it was led by the soldiers.” 
 
In the early 1960s, the military went through a difficult period. An overthrow of the 
civilian regime by a group of military officers in 1960 led to other coup attempts, 
revealing the military leadership’s lack of control over lower officers. But one renegade 
colonel was hanged to set an example, and the leadership began to consolidate the 
military’s hierarchy. In the end, the military came out of these hectic years looking like 
the most serious, well-organized, and effective institution around—the only one capable 
of stepping in when civilian authorities failed to perform adequately. This perceived 
competence, coupled with the Turks’ long-standing fear of invasions, war, and state 
collapse, helped elevate the military, in the minds of many, to the status of Turkey’s all-
around protector, from both external and internal threats. The brief military coups of 
1970 and 1980, both of which were followed by a rapid return to civilian leadership, only 
confirmed the public’s impression that the military generally seizes civilian power to 
protect it. 
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True, the Turkish military’s popularity has suffered a few blows in recent years, partly 
because of debates spawned by liberalization, greater scrutiny of military activities, and 
the emergence of a new powerful economic elite. The so-called February 28 process of 
1997, during which the military-dominated National Security Council (NSC) pressured 
the democratically elected Islamist government of Necmettin Erbakan to step down, left 
some Turks with the uneasy perception that the armed forces were no longer just going 
after radical Islamists but also targeting the simply pious. 
 
Still, the military remains more popular than any other institution in Turkey. Military 
service is compulsory; nonetheless, every troop sendoff prompts spontaneous public 
celebrations, with music and parades and honking cars. Many Turks today still think of 
Turkey as asker millet, “an army nation,” reflecting their perception that a symbiotic 
relationship binds the state to the armed forces that founded it and now protect it. For the 
Turkish public, the military is inseparable from the idea of the nation. 
 
 
ESPRIT DE CORPS 
 
The military shares the public’s perception of its role, seeing itself as the guardian of 
Turkey’s stability. And because the generals perceive the country’s integrity to be a 
corollary of the military’s own, they view the survival of Turkey as hinging on 
maintaining the internal cohesion of the corps. As a result, the Turkish military has 
adopted two strategies: it has tried to shield itself from threats posed by the divisions 
within mainstream society, and it has projected its power back into civilian life. 
 
To keep itself strong, the TGS has tried hard to insulate its ranks from the fault lines that 
run through the rest of the country. The TGS considers Turkey’s religious, sectarian, and 
ethnic fragmentation—pitting Islamists against secularists, Sunnis against Alevis (who 
are members of a branch of Islam related to Shiism), and Turks against Kurds—to be a 
danger that must be kept at bay. Were these differences allowed to penetrate the military, 
the thinking goes, they might threaten it and, by extension, the nation as a whole. The top 
military brass believe Turkey has not yet developed into a cohesive society. The 
introduction of multiparty politics in the late 1940s magnified the country’s social 
fragmentation by allowing sectarian, ethnic, and religious differences to find an 
expression in political life. Now, the military fears that various lobbies can unduly 
influence voters’ political choices as well as public appointments and the allocation of 
government resources. It is willing to tolerate these social divisions only if a guard such 
as itself is tasked with monitoring them. But in no case can they be allowed to undermine 
the guard itself. 
 
The military has also sought to centralize its power by maintaining a strong hierarchy and 
limiting the channels of civilian-military interaction. The chief of staff is the key figure in 
this centralization, along with the High Military Council, an advisory body that consists 
of all of the active four-star generals. The HMC’s principal role is to regularly present to 
the government the National Military Strategic Concept, which describes the military’s 
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ability to meet Turkey’s security objectives. These top generals are the only direct link 
between the Turkish military and the government. 
 
To preserve its cohesion, the military has tried to permeate the entire corps with a shared 
sense of purpose and imbue it with absolute loyalty. Below the four-star generals on the 
HMC, the Turkish army is organized along a three-layer pyramid-shaped structure. In the 
top tier are lower-ranking generals, outstanding officers who have consistently 
distinguished themselves and thus been anointed as guardians of the status quo. Below 
them, in the middle tier, is an advanced corps of special staff officers (known as Kurmay 
officers) who have attended the elite Turkish Military Academy, a university-level 
program with a rigorous entrance examination, and are deemed, thanks to their skills and 
loyalty, to have the potential for further promotion. At the bottom are all the other 
officers. 
 
The TGS has also created an elaborate system of promotions, sanctions, and training. (In 
the 1970s, after civilian courts were said to interfere with military discipline, the Turkish 
military set up a parallel court system to manage its ranks on its own.) Rewards such as 
foreign assignments, additional social benefits, and services provided by the Armed 
Forces Pension Fund are also used to cultivate loyalty. Military schools are designed to 
build a unitary mindset. Laxity at the Army War College was blamed for recurrent coup 
attempts in the early 1960s; a relaxing of the curriculum and the hiring of visiting civilian 
faculty were thought to have caused ideological polarization in the early 1970s. Since 
then, the military has kept a tight leash on young trainees to prevent, at the earliest stage 
possible, the officer class from being influenced by external ideologies that could upset 
the military’s homogeneous worldview. 
 
These strategies are not unique to the Turkish military, at least not in form. But they play 
an unusually significant role in maintaining the corps’ hierarchy and so, the TGS 
believes, in allowing it to fulfill its historical role of holding together this inherently 
heterogeneous nation. The result is a singular, self-replicating class of generals, towering 
over an institution with a single mindset. Although the military elite is sometimes said to 
be split between hard-liners and moderates, these factions disagree less about the 
substance of the military’s core policies than about communication styles. Despite slight 
divergences of opinion among some of its generals, the Turkish military basically makes 
decisions as a unitary, rational actor and speaks with one voice. 
 
In addition to shielding itself from what it perceives to be threats from within Turkish 
society, the Turkish military tries to maintain its power by projecting that power into 
civilian governance. Until the 1990s, after conducting various coups to restore national 
order, it set up footholds in institutions that in most democratic countries would be 
entirely run by civilians. These were often established at the expense and without the 
approval of the politicians. 
 
The most important of these is the NSC, which sets Turkey’s national security policies. 
The NSC’s mission and membership were determined by the post-coup constitution of 
1961 and adjusted during subsequent overthrows. Over time, the military increased its 
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dominance on the NSC because it believed that the council was the most effective—and 
most legitimate—venue in which to shape security-related policies. (In the military’s 
view, civilian politicians, held back by populist concerns, often failed to respond 
promptly to security challenges.) The NSC was initially designed to have seven civilian 
members (or eight in some special circumstances) and four military representatives, but 
the number of military representatives later rose steadily. With the 1982 constitution, the 
NSC’s composition changed to five military members and five civilians, and the 
council’s civilian president often voted with the military. The NSC’s mandate also 
expanded. Originally an advisory body, the council became an “instructing” body, whose 
ideas were given priority over those of all the other government agencies. And as military 
officers also gained control of the NSC’s secretariat, they increasingly set the council’s 
agenda. 
 
In the 1980s, the Turkish military also created the Council of Higher Education (YK) and 
placed on it a supervisory military representative. The rationale behind creating the YK 
and subjecting it to permanent military oversight was to bring order to the universities, 
which had been the epicenter of the ideological warfare and street violence that led the 
country to the brink of civil war in the 1970s and brought about the 1980 coup. Similarly, 
the Radio and Television High Council was created to monitor the media; it, too, had one 
military representative. 
 
By the middle of the decade, with the empowering provisions of the 1982 constitution in 
effect, the Turkish military had a firm hand in politics. It had achieved considerable 
internal cohesion. Although domestic security was still very much a problem, the 
leadership had set up enough listening posts in civilian institutions to be able to sense and 
monitor emerging dangers. And thanks to the NSC, it could place its concerns on the 
public agenda and force the government to deal with them. 
 
 
THE GRAND CONSENSUS 
 
At the end of the 1990s, the civilian and military elites found a common cause behind 
which to rally and in the pursuit of which they could both play their proper roles: 
preparing Turkey for EU membership. After four decades of bumpy progress, Turkey’s 
advance toward EU membership was momentarily frozen at the 1997 Luxembourg 
summit, when the Europeans displayed uncertainty about Turkey’s eligibility for 
accession. But at the Helsinki summit of December 1999, EU leaders finally certified 
Turkey’s “full eligibility” for membership, elevating it to the level of other candidate 
countries. 
 
Although the Europeans, both in informal and formal documents and negotiations, had 
consistently criticized the role of the military in Turkish politics, talk of actually curbing 
it did not begin in earnest until after 1999. Until that time, the EU had interpreted 
civilian-military relations in Turkey as a general expression of the country’s low 
democratic standards and so had made broad recommendations that Ankara promote 
democratization, expand minority rights, and push economic liberalization. But in the 
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1990s, Brussels started actively demanding compliance with the so-called Copenhagen 
criteria, the economic and political conditions (including respect for democratic 
principles and human rights) required for EU membership. EU leaders asked, for 
example, that the Turkish military’s unusual prerogatives in civilian institutions, and 
especially its power over the NSC, be substantially curbed. Since then, they have come to 
expect of the Turkish military not only that it reform its institutional functions, but also 
that it relax its opposition to ethnic diversity and allow the corps’ own composition to 
better reflect Turkey’s multicultural character. 
 
EU demands have mostly centered on giving civilian authorities greater control over the 
military. They have included shifting the balance of power on the NSC in favor of 
civilian members; allowing civilians to lead the drafting of the NSC papers that define the 
threats facing the country; giving civilian authorities supervisory power over military 
expenses, promotions, and dismissals; removing military representatives from 
nonmilitary councils; and subjecting military judicial institutions to civilian oversight. 
More broadly, the EU reforms have called for a virtual revolution of the military’s 
mindset, requiring that the military’s traditionally expansive interpretation of its mission 
to protect the country be redefined in a much more narrow way. Particularly challenging 
is the EU’s demand that Turkey, and thus indirectly the military, recognize and 
accommodate the country’s many layers of diversity—the very fault lines that the TGS 
has long feared. The EU requirements mean that the military will eventually have to open 
its ranks to religious, ethnic, and sectarian diversity, threatening the cohesion it has 
perfected over the years. 
 
For the Turkish political elite, the Helsinki summit seemed to be the rebirth of a great 
opportunity. In 1999, the most prominent Turkish politicians were President Sleyman 
Demirel, Prime Minister Blent Ecevit, and the leader of the Motherland Party, Mesut 
Yilmaz. They realized that some radical changes would be needed to successfully 
revitalize relations with the EU and pave Turkey’s way to accession—specifically, 
changes in the government’s struggle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the violent 
Kurdish separatist group known as the PKK; in the government’s relations with Greece; 
and within the power structure of the Turkish state. And they knew that achieving any 
progress on these issues would require the support of the Turkish armed forces. 
 
Fortunately, like the civilian authorities, the Turkish military supported EU membership. 
Not only would accession be the crowning achievement of Turkey’s modernization, but 
the process leading to it would also offer a way to respond to several challenges facing 
the country. It was not one of many grand strategies, but rather the best choice on an 
extremely short list of imperfect options. In fact, for the Turkish military, the only true 
alternative to seeking EU membership was to confront these challenges alone—an 
unsavory proposition that might have led to failure or, at best, reversals of the country’s 
impressive social, economic, and political progress. The prospect of EU membership, it 
was hoped, would galvanize Turkish elites and society around a great opportunity, 
creating a grand consensus that might transcend the nation’s deep fractures. 
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Shortly after the Helsinki decision, then Chief of Staff Hseyin Kivrikoglu announced the 
TGS’s support for the EU membership process: “We view the EU decision for Turkey to 
be for the full benefit of the Turkish nation. We support it wholeheartedly.” Turkish-EU 
relations soon became one of the most discussed items at NSC meetings, and the 




A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
 
This resolve nonetheless left the Turkish armed forces in a difficult position. On the one 
hand, the military’s support for EU membership was consistent with its historical role as 
the country’s pioneer of modernization. Long devoted to the secular values of Turkey’s 
first president, Atatrk, the military has been the driving force behind reform movements 
ever since the declining years of the Ottoman Empire. The prospect of heading a truly 
European army appealed to it. On the other hand, to meet Brussels’ requirements the 
military would have to fundamentally alter the way it performed its mission of stabilizing 
Turkey and keeping it secure. It was left walking a tightrope. Whatever resistance it may 
have occasionally displayed since then has stemmed not from any fundamental 
ambivalence about EU membership, but from these internal tensions, which have been 
magnified by a significant degree of mistrust toward some EU policies. 
 
Still, pragmatism has proved a powerful motivator and so far has convinced the military 
to comply with the reforms. A major argument for promoting EU-driven reform has been 
the TGS’s understanding that the road to EU membership, although treacherous, could 
provide solutions to some of Turkey’s main problems: the Kurdish question, rising 
Islamism, worsening relations with Greece, chronic economic difficulties, internal 
disagreement about U.S. policies in Iraq, and the possibility that Turkey might be left out 
of the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU’s planned independent military 
force. 
 
Above all, by 1999, the Turkish military was growing weary and discouraged by its 
inability to eradicate, after decades of efforts, various internal threats, such as Kurdish 
separatism, Marxist activism, radical Islamism, and ultranationalism. Its attempts had not 
only exhausted the Turkish military but also begun to endanger its institutional integrity. 
As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the TGS was growing more ready to consider 
civilian responses to these threats. The military’s struggle against the PKK over the 
previous quarter century, in particular, had convinced the generals that it was time to 
adopt a different approach. In this low-intensity conflict, soldiers had been forced into 
direct contact with people in the remote countryside along the Turkish frontiers. 
Indoctrinated since the early days of military dormitory school by slogans of unity, some 
80,000 officers based in Turkey’s southeastern region confronted the realities of their 
linguistically, ideologically, and culturally heterogeneous country. It was becoming 
increasingly difficult for the TGS to promote the idea of homogeneity, even within the 
military’s ranks. 
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The prospect of EU membership offered something of an answer to these problems. First, 
joining the EU would bring Turkey economic benefits, which would indirectly help 
Ankara battle terrorism and maintain the country’s territorial and political integrity. 
Second, as Turkey progressed toward EU membership, European nations might grow less 
supportive of the PKK, in particular its armed wing. Without legitimacy and significant 
external support, it would be harder for the PKK to continue its armed struggle. Third, 
and perhaps most important, the EU membership process would provide a framework to 
deal with the Kurdish issue. Because the EU required that Turkish politicians be 
primarily responsible for dealing with the PKK, it effectively absolved the TGS from 
handling that thorny task and from officially endorsing a policy of accommodation 
toward the secessionists whom the military had long fought. The prospect of EU 
membership, which was extremely popular within Turkish society, thus allowed the TGS 
to go along with reforms for Kurdish rights without being accused of betraying those who 
had died fighting the separatists. 
 
By 1999, the time seemed ripe for dramatic changes on other matters as well. The ever-
disturbing issue of rising Islamism, the military’s long-held convictions about balancing 
Greece’s EU-derived power, the military’s increasing fears of falling into strategic 
isolation, and pressing economic crises—all forced the TGS toward realism. The 
military’s decision to address all these concerns through the EU membership process was 
the consequence of a simple cost-benefit analysis: the costs of tackling these major 
problems alone seemed to surpass those of meeting European demands, even though 
compliance would inevitably transform the Turkish armed forces. And so the NSC’s 
national security policy document for 2001 recorded not only Turkey’s goal of gaining 
membership in the EU but also a major concession by the TGS on one of the most 
complicated issues in Turkish politics. Addressing the Kurdish question and 
multiculturalism, the document stated, “Our citizens, who are united under the banner of 
Turkish national identity, should have their cultural and local linguistic characteristics be 
considered as individual rights and freedoms.” 
 
At the end of 2002, following the parliamentary victory of the Islamist Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the selection of zkk as 
chief of staff, some worried that Turkey’s new leaders would be unable to work together. 
But the grand consensus held. For Erdogan and his party, the decision to endorse reform 
was easy. Committing to economic liberalization and privatization, as demanded by the 
EU, would ingratiate the party with the Turkish public, especially the business elite and a 
growing Muslim bourgeoisie. Deeper engagement with Europe would allow the AKP to 
shift away from a U.S.-centric foreign policy. For zkk and the armed forces, the calculus 
remained the same. And so, as long as the new politicians remained loyal to the grand 
consensus, their Islamism would be an irritant but not a deal breaker. 
 
Reforms continued. The military representatives on the boards of the Council of Higher 
Education and the Radio and Television High Council were removed. The Kurds were 
granted broadcasting rights. In 2003, the ratio of civilians to military officers on the NSC 
was increased, and a civilian was elected to head the NSC’s secretariat. The military 
leadership continued to discuss changes on a variety of other issues, such as introducing 
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civilian supervision of military expenses, removing laws that had strengthened the 
military’s autonomy (such as the prohibition on appealing military court decisions), and 
revising the role of soldiers in state protocol. 
 
In addition to helping Turkey’s military and civilian authorities manage their relations 
with each other, pressure from Brussels has sometimes also helped them avoid conflicts 
with some of their respective constituencies. The AKP, for example, can quiet its hard-
core religious supporters who advocate removing the law banning women from wearing 
head scarves in universities and other public institutions by saying that the issue will have 
to be resolved in the context of EU negotiations. Likewise, the military can avoid 
negative reactions to its policy of accommodating Kurdish demands for reform by 
claiming that it must take such steps to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. The prospect of 
EU membership has had the indirect effect, therefore, of mollifying radical constituents 
in both the civilian and military camps who might have encouraged more confrontational 
relations between the two groups. 
 
 
IN THE EU’S COURT 
 
There is little reason to think that the Turkish military will retreat from this pattern of 
reform anytime soon. Even moderate progress toward addressing the Kurdish question, 
the threat of political Islamism, and Turkey’s economic problems will provide additional 
motivation for the Turkish military to continue its reforms—so long, that is, as those 
reforms do not challenge its internal integrity or that of Turkey at large. As the country’s 
ultimate guardian, the military will carefully balance the EU’s demands for reform, 
especially those regarding cultural diversity, with national security. And although so far it 
has relinquished some of its footholds in civilian institutions, the military may need to see 
more evidence that Turkey’s march toward membership in the EU—a new guardian for 
stability—is irreversible before it gives up more of its traditional prerogatives. 
 
There is within the Turkish military no inherent block to further progress. Despite its 
staunch commitment to Kemalism, the army has proved remarkably flexible over the 
years. Although the ideology has sometimes been considered an obstacle to EU 
membership because it promotes sovereignty, statism, and nationalism, it has in fact been 
adapted very well to suit new situations. The Turkish military has repeatedly redefined 
Kemalism to synchronize itself with—or, if necessary, to counterbalance—its 
environment. If the EU process reaches a level at which the military no longer feels the 
need to preserve the ideology in its current form in order to meet Turkey’s security 
challenges, the TGS will redefine Kemalism again. 
 
At this point, the EU itself may be the main threat to further reform. If it fails to show as 
great a commitment to Turkey’s accession as Turkey has shown so far, the EU could 
jeopardize the grand consensus that brought Turkey’s military and civilian authorities 
together. Like the TGS, AKP leaders have a great interest in seeing accession through. 
But they may have as great a stake in dragging out the process itself: the prospect of EU 
accession is so popular that as long as the AKP remains actively committed to the 
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negotiations, it can present itself as a centrist party, appeal to large segments of the 
population, and thus stay in power. The process also helps it keep the military’s influence 
in check. For the military, however, the real prize is membership proper. If, despite all the 
reforms, full membership does not materialize, it is Turkey’s military, not its politicians, 
that will be left trying to hold together an even more fragmented country. 
 
The EU’s decision last October to start membership negotiations with Turkey appears to 
be a positive sign. But problems are never far off, and Ankara’s refusal to recognize 
Cyprus, the rise of the Islamists’ power in Turkey, and Kurdish secessionism could prove 
to be obstacles to accession. If Kurdish separatists, failing to see a future for themselves 
in a European Turkey, continue to resort to violence, the Turkish military might hang on 
to its remaining prerogatives in the name of national security. Should the Islamists begin 
to fill in the gaps in state institutions created by the military’s retreat, the TGS could 
decide to cling on to its power. 
 
The key to further reform thus appears to be timing. The EU must bear in mind that it 
should not hasten to ask for the removal of the military’s remaining footholds in Turkish 
civilian society. As it attempts to navigate the treacherous and destabilizing process of 
EU membership, the TGS is likely to hold on to the tools and methods it has long used to 
keep soldiers in line. And that might be just fine. Much like captains trying to dock an oil 
tanker in a new port, Turkey’s top generals are impelled to steer Turkey’s reform with the 
strategies they have developed over the years. Understandably, they will not relinquish 
their proven methods until they are confident that the port’s onshore docking systems—
the institutions, the policies, and, ultimately, the promises of the EU—are viable and will 
keep the tanker from crashing. 
 
Seeing Turkey through a safe transformation is in everyone’s best interest. For the 
Europeans, avoiding the Balkanization of their newest candidate member has obvious 
benefits. For the United States, a stable and democratic Turkey is a crucial asset for the 
prospect of regime change in the greater Middle East. And for the Turks, seeing further 
evidence that Turkey’s military can still project national confidence during a time of 
radical change will ease the final stage of the country’s historic journey toward 
modernization. 
 
